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Legislative Problems Surrounding Racially
Balanced Public Schools: A Critical
Examination. of the Responses and the
Prospects
James Bolner*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An inquiry into the problems surrounding legislation relative to
racial balance in public schools might appear to be an irrelevant
academic endeavor. It has been argued that racial desegregation as a
public ideal is passe and that segregation (currently advocated by
certain Negro "separatists") represents the emergent ideal. Despite the'
inroads of the "'new segregation," this critical.survey of the legislative
problems of racial balance rests on the assumption that some form of
political assimilation of racial minorities remains a viable public goal
for America.
For many years the political-legal attempts to implement the
rights of the Negro minority in America have focused on the field of
public education. It is the writer's view that current widespread
confusion concerning the racial composition of public school
populations forms a major 6bstacle to better racial relations.' This
article is an examination of the ways in which the problem of racial
concentrations of minorities in public schools has been met in a variety
of forums: state legislatures, state and federal educational and civil
rights agencies, and the United States Congress. The article is intended
to enhance the reader's understanding of the complexities of legislating
in the realm of racial relations.
II.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING

Brown v. Boardof Education and Racial Balance

The Brown decisions of 19542 and 19553 were concerned with
*

1.

Associate Professor of Government, Louisiana State University
For a representative description of the relevant published commentary, see J.
6-38 (1968).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 249 (1955).
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legally required racial segregation in public schools. But what did these
cases teach relative to the mere concentration of pupils of a given race

in certain schools? Does racial imbalance constitute a violation of the
Constitution? One may find language in the Courts' opinions which

supports both an affirmative and a negative view.
In the 1954 opinion, the Court quotes with approval the language
of the lower court in the Kansas case:
'Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency
to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and to
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated
school system."

The court's reference to "sanction of the law," lends force to the
argument that the Court was addressing itself to legally required

segregation and nothing more. Much language in the opinion, however,
suggests that the Court was striking down all nonwhite pupil con-

centrations regardless of cause. The Court found inequality in
"separate but equal" educational facilities precisely because intangibles
were at stake-intangibles such as the "feelings of inferiority" which
Negro pupils experienced when they were concentrated in public

schools. Viewed in this light, the "sanction of the law" to which the
Court referred is merely an aggravating factor. Consider the following
language, which appears after the Court has rejected "separate but
equal" as an irrelevant doctrine:
In the instant cases, that question [whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held
inapplicable to public education] is directly presented. Here. . . there are findings
below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of
teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on
merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools
involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation
itself on public education"

The effect of segregation, of course, is found to be detrimental.

An important addition to the constitutional theory on racial
concentrations in public schools was made in the 1955 Brown opinion.
There the Court issued its enforcement decree embodying the "all

deliberate speed" desegregation formula and directed district courts to:
consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition
4. 347 U.S. at 494.
5. Id. at 492.
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of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school
districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and revision
of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing
problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may
propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system.6

B. JudicialStruggles with the Brown Rhetoric
There haye developed two almost diametrically opposed lines of
interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinions in the Brown cases.
One may be characterized by the slogan put forward by the district
court in Briggs v. Elliot: "The Constitution . . . does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination. '7 The Supreme Court
has allowed this view to stand by denying certiorari in Bell v. School
City of Gary,8 Downs v. Board of Education,' and Deal v. Board of
0
Education."
The Bell and Deal cases reached the Supreme Court from

Gary, Indiana, and Cincinnati, Ohio, respectively. Both Ohio and
Indiana had policies against racial segregation in education and in no

way could be charged with having maintained dual school systems. The
Downs case arose in Kansas City, Kansas, and, despite the fact that
Kansas had once permitted segregation on a local option basis," the

lower courts found that the concentrations of Negro pupils was the
2
result of residential patterns and not of discriminatory school policies.'

The second line of interpretation rejects the Briggs theory and
subscribes to the view that Brown and the fourteenth amendment
6. 349 U.S. at300-01.
7. 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). It should be pointed out that the Briggs doctrine
was specifically rejected in United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). The Fifth Circuit's per curiam opinion declared: "The
Court holds that boards and officials administering public schools in this circuit have the
affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated, unitary school
system in which there are no Negro schools and no white schools-just schools. Expressions in
our earlier opinions distinguishing between integration and desegregation must yield to this
affirmative duty we now recognize. . . .To the extent that earlier decisions of this Court (more
in the language of the opinions, than in the effect of the holdings) conflict with this view, the
decisions are overruled." Id. at 389. Two of the dissenting judges interpreted the majority opinion
as specifically overruling Briggs. Id. at 415 (Bell, J. dissenting).
8. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), affd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924 (1964).
9. 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1214 (D. Kan. 1963), affd, 366 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
10. 244 F. Supp. 572 (S. D. Ohio 1965), aff'd, 369"F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967).
I1. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,486 n.l (1954).
12. Downs v. Board of Educ., 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1213, 1216 (D. Kan. 1964).
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prohibit all Negro pupil imbalances. 3 This interpretation is premised
on the theory that the community, either through its discriminatory
housing policies or its general economic discrimination against
minorities, is responsible for isolating the Negro. Those adopting this
position generally support the view that school authorities are
constitutionally required to take steps to assimilate minorities into the
community. The Court has given some tacit support to this approach
by denying certiorari in Taylor v. Board of Education." This case-the

so-called New Rochelle case-brought into question the school
authorities' past policies of racially gerrymandering attendance zones.
The federal district court ordered the local school authorities to
transport certain pupils to specified schools on the theory that Brown
granted Negro children a constitutional right to associate with white
15
children.
The most exhaustive statement of the policy and constitutional
justification for the doctrine of positive racial balance was provided by
the District Court for the District of Columbia in Hobson v. Hansen"
in 1967. In Hobson the court ordered school authorities of the District
of Columbia~to adopt a plan which would bring together pupils of
different races, as well as pupils of different economic and social
backgrounds. The court went considerably beyond any prior judicial
statement to assert a positive constitutional necessity for racially (as
well as socially and economically) balanced classrooms. In order to
correct a system which minimized socio-economic and racial
integration, the-court ordered faculty desegregation, the abolition of
optional attendance zones and ability grouping, and transportation for
children from overcrowded school districts into underpopulated ones.
The Hobson court's, premises are apparent from the following
findings of fact:
i. Racially and socially homogeneous schools damage the minds and spirit of
all children who attend them-the Negro, the white, the poor and the
affluent-and block the attainment of the broader goals of democratic education,
whether the segregation occurs by law or by fact.
13. Two influential scholarly statements supporting this view are Fiss, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564 (1965), and Sedler,
School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 228 (1963).
14. 191 F. Supp, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 294 F.2d. 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 940 (1961).
'15. The following language of Judge Kaufman illustrates the tenor of his opinion: "In a
community such as New Rochelle, the presence of some 29 white children certainly does not
afford the 454 Negro children in the school the educational and social contacts and interaction
envisioned by Brown." 191 F. Supp. at 193.
16. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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2. The scholastic achievement 6f the disadvantaged child, Negro and white, is
strongly related to the racial and socio-economic composition of the student body
of his school. A racially and socially integrated school environment
7 increases the
scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child of whatever race.1

In a related development the Supreme Court has refused to
consider racial balance cases upholding the power of state authorities
to take steps to effect racial balance in schools. 18 In these cases local
authorities had taken steps designed to alter the neighborhood school
patterns in order to bring white students and nonwhite students into
contact with each other; the action was challenged by white parents.
- Despite the rather confusing posture of the post-Brown
constitutional rules applied in.the nonsouthern state and federal
jurisdictions, the Court has been quite clear in its rulings insofar as
Southern schools are concerned. In the important case of Green v.
School Board of New Kent County, 9 the Court adopted the position
of the Federal Office of Education and declared constitutionally
suspect any "freedom of choice plan" which did not actually result in
substantial racial mixing. The county school board in question
operated two schools; one was formerly the school which whites were
required to-attend, and the other was formerly the school which
Negroes were required to attend. The authorities did not use attendance
zones and each school served the entire county. Under the freedom of
choice plan "each pupil, except those entering the first and eighth
grades, may annually choose between New Kent and Watkins schools
and pupils not making a choice are assigned to the school previously
attended; first and eighth grade pupils must affirmatively choose a
school. 2 " The Court found that this scheme violated its ruling in the
1955 Brown case because in a three year period "not a single.white
child has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro
children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 and
Ill in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the
all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains
a dual system." 21 The Court mentioned the establishment of geographic
17. Id. at 406.
18. The most notable cases are those arising in New York. See, e.g., Vetere v. Allen, 15
N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert. denied sub non., 382 U.S. 825 (1965);
Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied. 379 U.S.
881 (1964); Addabbo v. Donovan, 22 A.D.2d 383, 256 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 905 (1965).
19. 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see the companion cases ofRaney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
443 (1968), and Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), in which the Court applied
the Green test.
20. 391 U.S. at 434.
21. Id. at 441.
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zones as one way of "realistically" converting "promptly to a system
without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools.""
The constitutional rules relative to racial balance in public schools
may be summarized as follows: (I) Those communities (Southern and
nonsouthern) that wish to launch programs aimed at promoting
racially balanced schools have earned the Court's constitutional
blessing. (2) Because of the South's segregationist past, Southern
school districts must show actual desegregation in terms of percentages
of whites attending schools with nonwhites. (3) The Supreme Court has
not definitely ruled that racial imbalance per se in nonsouthern school
districts is contrary to the Constitution.

111.

THE PROBLEM IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES

At the time of this writing, Massachusetts is the only state that
has taken legislative action to remedy racial imbalance 3 For at least
two reasons, it is unlikely that any additional state laws will be enacted
on the matter. First, in most states where public opinion would support
such legislation, action taken by administrative officials has made
legislative action largely unnecessary. Second, in legislation dealing
with civil rights and with federal aid to public education, Congress had
adopted policy statements designed to discourage racial imbalance.
This state administrative action and congressional legislative policy will
be examined below.
The Massachusetts law referred to above was enacted in August
1965 and has survived a constitutional challenge in the
Commonwealth's Supreme Judicial Court. 4 The law was the product
of a complex political situation, with the leaders of the political parties
in Massachusetts competing to have their respective parties
22. Id. at 442. On the authority of Green the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered
37 school districts in Louisiana to abandon freedom of choice schemes in favor of pupil and staff
assignment plans which would result in racially heterogeneous schools for the 1969-70 school year.
N.Y. Times, May 29, 1969. at 16. On August 28, 1969, HEW secured a postponement of the
deadline for integration plans (originally set for September I) to December I, 1969, insofar as
Mississippi schools were concerned. A stay of this order was reluctantly denied by Supreme Court
Justice Hugo Black. Id., Sept. 6, 1969, at 16, col. 3. During the summer of 1969 the
administration of President Nixon adopted a "go slow" attitude toward desegregation and shifted
the responsibility for implementing desegregation from HEW to the Justice Department; the
administration was allegedly planning to rely more heavily on litigation and less on withholding
funds to effect desegregation during the 1969-70 school year. Id., Sept. 17, 1969, at IS, col. I.
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71 §§ 37C, 37D (Supp. 1967). See also id. ch. 15. §§ IIIK. For a discussion of this statute see Note, Massachusetis Racial Imbalance Act, 5 HARV, J.
LEGIS.

83 (1967).

24.

School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967).
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remembered as the "party of civil rights. 21 5 The State Board of
Education welcomed this support from the party leadership, and as its
own contribution to the passage of the law, established the Kiernan
Blue-Ribbon Committee on Racial Imbalance in Public Schools-a
body made up of leaders in industry, labor, civic affairs, the clergy, and
the professions generally. The Committee presented a report*6 that may
best be described as a hastily compiled sketch of research findings,
legislative proposals, and editorial statements all in the spirit of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights' 1967 publication, Racial
Isolation in Public Schools.27 With only slight changes, the text of the
law suggested in the Committee's report was enacted by the legislature.
The Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Law of 1965 contains the
following provisions:
(1) It is declared to be "the policy of the commonwealth" to promote
racial balance and to correct racial imbalance in public schools. The
prevention or elimination of racial imbalance is prescribed as "an
objective in all decisions involving" determinations of attendance zones
and selection of school locations.2 (2) School committees (boards)
are required to conduct racial censuses as directed by the state
commissioner of education. If these reveal racial imbalance, the state
board of education shall notify the local committee, which shall then
prepare a plan designed to eliminate racial imbalance. "Racial
imbalance" is defined as:
a ratio between non-white and other students in public schools which is sharply
out of balance with the racial composition of the society in which non-white
children study, serve and work. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance
shall be deemed to exist when the per cent of non-white students in any public
school is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of the total number of
students in such schools. 9

(3) State funds are withheld from any school committee which fails
to "show progress within a reasonable time in eliminating racial
imbalance."3
25.

For an enlightening legal analysis of the law, see Note, The Massachusetts Racial

Imbalance Act. 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 83 (1967). The political and constitutional context of the law
is examined in Bolner & Shanley, Civil Rights in the Political Process: An Analysis of the
Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Law oJ 1965 (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts

Bureau of Government Research, 1967).
26.

MASS. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

ADVISORY COI\IITTEE ON RACIAL IMBALANCE

AND EDUCATION. BECAUSE IT ISRIGHT-EDUCATIONALLY (1965).

27. U.S. COMIISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. RACIAL ISOLATION
(1967).
28. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37C (Supp. 1967).
29. Id. § 37D.
30. /d.ch. 15, § II.
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(4) "Whenever the board of education is satisfied that the
construction or enlargement of a schoolhouse is for the purpose of
reducing or eliminating racial imbalance" the state will increase the
amount of state construction funds to 65 percent of the cost.'"
The Massachusetts law was designed to deal with tense racial
situations such as that existing in Boston's Roxbury ghetto, by
requiring the city's school committee to close selected schools,
redistrict attendance zones, and bus a limited number of students. One
provision of the law, adopted as a concession to the antibusing forces, :'
bears a close similarity to the language of the 1968 federal legislation
discussed below. The language of this provision was considered a
victory for "civil rights" because it was thought unlikely that parents
would file the objections to which the provision referred. The provision
reads:
No school committee or regional school district committee shall be required
as part of its plan to transport any pupil to any school outside its jurisdiction or
to any school outside the school district established for his neighborhood, if the
parent or guardian of such pupil files written objection thereto with such school
committee2'
IV.

THE PROBLEM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE BERKELEY MODEL

By late 1968 a number of communities had embarked upon
programs designed to effect racial balance in public schools." The best
known experiment in this direction was not in Massachusetts or New
York, but in Berkeley, California. Beginning in the fall of 1968 that
community's schools were entirely reorganized on the theory that the
high educational value of racially balanced learning situations justified
the revamping. The factor that distinguishes Berkeley's plan from its
predecessors is the deliberate attempt to bring pupils into contact with
peers of heterogeneous backgrounds. The redrawing of attendance
zones was motivated by a desire to bring "better socio-economic
balance to the zones." The grouping of children within the classrooms
was to follow to the letter the court's admonitions in Hobson v.
Hansen.3 5 A publication of the Berkeley school officials declared:
31. Id.
32. See Bolner & Shanley, supra note 25, at 55-56.
33. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 37D (Supp. 1967).
34.

See, e.g., Hearings Before the Special Subconit. on Civil Rights. 88th Cong., 2d Sess,,
CRAIN. THE POLITICS or SCHOOL

ser. 23, at 198-200 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; R.
DESEGREGATION 13-27, 59-71, 81-101 (1968).
35. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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Pupils will be assigned to classes so that groups will be heterogenous by race,
sex, academic performance and, if possible, by socio-economic level. Principals,
with staffs, may use additional criteria, such as age, emotional patterns, interests
and pupil leaders or followers to maintain heterogeneity.
Within the classrooms, we will continue to strive to individualize instructions by
using flexible instructional groups. These will be formed and re-formed during the
day, week, or school year to teach particular skills in cluster groups within the
classroom structure or between individual classrooms. Maximum effort will be
made to avoid racially segregated groups within the classrooms and in school
activities?"

The plan's implementation necessitated the busing of 3,400 children
and cost 530,290 dollars for the initial year, approximately 38 percent
of which was to be devoted to transportation and another 38 percent
to meet "Fire Marshall requirements ."3
Berkeley's geographical characteristics and population statistics
make it a likely candidate for relatively successful racial balancing
along the lines of its original plan. It is not large (about ten square
miles) and is quite compact in configuration. Its population of 121,000
is nicely balanced between whites (51 percent), Negroes (41 percent),
Orientals (7 percent) and one percent "other." The city is atypical in
that about half of the nonwhites own their own homes and the level of
education exceeds that of the country generally.-"
One potential problem area in the Berkeley plan is the altered
status of the public school classroom teacher. The new Berkeley policy
now calls for interracial school staffs whose interracial proportions will
approach those of the school population itself.39 This means that
teachers will ordinarily be assigned on the basis of administrative
decisions rather than choice. It is quite possible that this factor might
well lead to teacher dissatisfaction.
V.

THE PROBLEM IN THE REALM OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-MAKING.

It was pointed out that the State Board of Education played a role
in securing enactment of the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Law.
One may safely make the following generalization: the chief impetus
for racially balanced schools has come from state and federal
administrative officials rather than from the legislative branches. In
New York, New Jersey, and California the state commissioners of
36. Integration: A Plan for Berkeley, at 20 (a report of Neil V. Sullivan, Superintendent
of Schools, to the Berkeley Board of Education, 1967).
37. Berkeley Unified School District, Fact Sheet on Integration no. 8, at 3 (August, 1968).
38.

Berkeley School Report-No. I1: Desegregation "68.at 2 (March, 1968).

39.

Berkeley Unified School District, Speakers FactSheet 2 (Mimeo., 1968).
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education have taken positions favoring racially balanced schools."' In
each of these states administrative laws aimed at the promotion of
racial balance in schools have been promulgated. In most cases the
actions taken by the state education commissioners were manifestations
of the dominant position which these authorities have within the state.
Indeed, one may make a compelling argument that a statute was
needed in Massachusetts precisely because the tradition of local school
autonomy was so strong. In the other states where action has been
taken, the tradition was one of "state centralism" in educationadministrative matters."
The numerous Civil Rights Commission studies and reports have
been indicative of that federal agency's policy of promoting racial
integration, as opposed to merely eradicating segregation. Its study on
Racial Isolation2" is a comprehensive research and policy statement
designed to provide the foundation for a policy of racial balance in the
nation's schools.
What stands out in all of this administrative action is that many
federal and state administrative officials have taken the position, either
on grounds of constitutional interpretation or public policy, that racial
balance is a policy so eminently in the common interest that it is worth
pursuing even at great social and economic cost. As the discussion of
the legislative battles over racial imbalance below will show, this is not
a position shared by most contemporary federal legislators.
Finally, one should note that the Attorney General of the United
States has invoked Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 3 to institute
suits in nonsouthern states despite language in the 1964 law which
would appear to bar such suits. Title IV authorizes the Attorney
General to sue for relief of complainants alleging racial discrimination
by public educational authorities, but a limiting proviso reads:
[N]othing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to
issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the
transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school
district to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge
the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional
standards."
40. For illustrative actions by state education officers see New York Commissioner or
Education Memorandum of June 14, 1963, Racial Balance in Schools (Allen Memorandum) 8
RAcE REL. L. REP. 738-39 (1963); New Jersey Commissioner of Education (Ruline), Spruill v.
Board of Educ.. 8 RACE RI:L. L. REP. 1234 (1963); Statement of the California authorities in 7
RAcL REL. L. REP. 1267-69 (1962).

41. For a discussion of this point, see Note, supra note 23, at 96-98.
42. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ctoc-9 (1964).
44. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000c-6 (1964).
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Despite this language, the Department of Justice has brought five
suits against school authorities in nonsouthern states charging
"discrimination in the assignment of students and teachers."'' 5 The
announcements of the Department take great pains to stress that the
authorities in question had engaged in "Southern-style"
discrimination. It is, of course, highly probable that if the Department
undertakes to pressure large numbers of nonsouthern school districts
to stop what the Department terms segregation, the protest in the
communities will find its way into Congress just as the protest over the
HEW desegregation guidelines in the South found its way into
Congress.
The energetic efforts of the Office of Education within the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) at the federal
level will be discussed in the following section. In addition to support
from the Federal Civil Rights Commission, HEW has strong allies in
the federal judiciary and the state judiciary outside the South.I
VI.

RACIAL BALANCE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITIED STATES CONGRESS

Before discussing racial balance legislation in the United States
Congress it is necessary to explain briefly how "racial imbalance"
figures in the legislative struggle. In 1968 Southern legislators
attempted to legislate a prohibition on the use of funds for the purpose
of requiring children to go to certain schools without the consent of
their parents.17 The response of nonsouthern forces has been to
"compromise" by accepting a prohibition on the use of' funds "to
overcome racial imbalance." Consequently, the Office of Education is
barred from using funds or withholding funds for the specific purpose
of requiring or forcing racial balance programs upon local school
agencies. But at the same time HEW officials are free to withhold
funds to force busing of students, to close schools, or to redraw
attendance zones over parental objection if the purpose of the program
in question is to overcome racial segregation and not to overcome
racial imbalance.
In essence, then, although the HEW officials are barred by the
1968 amendment from using or withholding funds to achieve forced
45. See United States Department of Justice Press Releases for April 25, 1968, May 31.
1968, and November 19, 1968.
46. Steamer, The Role of the Federal District Courts in the Desegregation Controversy, 22
J. OF POLITICS 417 (1960), Vines, Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations. 18
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 5 (1965). Vines presents statistical evidence tending to show that
Negroes "win" more cases than they "lose" in Southern state supreme courts.
47. 114 CONG. REC. (daily ed. June 26, 1968).
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racial balance, they are free to use or withhold funds to force
"desegregation." The position of the Office of Education has
consistently been that Southern schools are vestiges of "dual school
systems" and are not necessarily to be characterized as "racially
imbalanced."'" In addition, its approach has been to encourage
nonsouthern districts to engage in racial balance programs. In those
localities of the nonsouth where the local community is prepared to
engage in the experiment, HEW officials will use and withhold funds
to achieve racial balance.
A.

The Pre-1968 Struggle Over Racial Balance

The pre-1968 struggle over racial balance centered around the
debates over the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
(Model Cities) Act of 1966,11 the Elementary and Secondary
Education Amendments of 1966,10 and the HEW-Labor authorization legislation for 1967.51 The present discussion is confined to
a brief general analysis of the developments and the controversy.
1. The 1964 Civil Rights Act.-Racial imbalance made its
legislative debut in President John F. Kennedy's initial Civil Rights Act
proposal in 1963.52 In that bill the phenomena of racial imbalance and
segregation were treated in the same way. As finally enacted, however,
the 1964 Civil Rights Act defines segregation in a way that
distinguishes it from racial imbalance:
"Desegregation" mieans the assignment of students to public schools and within
such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but
"desegregation" shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in
order to overcome racial imbalance. "

This definition was the result of an attempt by the bill's Senate
managers to garner a sufficient number of votes to secure cloture. The
bill's managers, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey in particular, argued
that this definition would create a legal basis for cutting off federal
funds to those Southern schools that refused to desegregate, while
barring the Office of Education from treating mere homogeneous
48. For an instructive exposition of the positions of the Office of Education and former
Commissioner of Education Howe, see Hearings,supra note 34, at 4.
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (Supp. 1969).
50. 20 U.S.C. §§ 238, 241 (F) (Supp. I1. 1965-67).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 886 (C) (Supp. IfI. 1965-67).
52. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1963).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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concentrations as repugnant to the law.5 4 This maneuver was something
of a conciliatory gesture toward Southern colleagues-a declaration
that while the law was designed to end the subsidization of segregation,
it would not force "integration" on those localities that made it
possible for Negroes to attend schools without discrimination.
In short, Senator Humphrey and the proponents of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act accepted the interpretation of the 1954 and 1955 decisions
which held that although the Constitution prohibited discrimination, it
did not require integration.55 There is, of course, nothing necessarily
defective in the use of judicial interpretations as the building material
of legislative history. If the judicial doctrines are as unsettled as they
are and were in this area, however, their value as building material is
questionable.
In interpreting the Civil Rights Act the Office of Education and
the courts have attempted to further racial mixing in schools by
treating freedom of choice plans that fail to result in actual interracial
contacts as manifestations of bad faith on the part of the school
administrators. The guidelines of HEW reflect this view; they declare:
In districts with a sizable percentage of Negro or other minority group
students, the Commissioner will, in general, be guided by the following criteria in
scheduling free choice plans for review:
(I) If a significant percentage of the students, such as 8 or 9 percent,
transferred from segregated schools for the 1965-66 school year, total transfers on
the order of at least twice that percentage would normally be expected.
(2) If a smaller percentage of the students, such as 4 percent or 5 percent,
transferred from segregated schools for the 1965-66 school year, a substantial
increase in transfers would normally be expected, such as would bring the total
to at least triple the percentage for the 1965-66 school year.
(3) If a lower percentage of students transferred for the 1965-66 school
year, then the rate of increase in total transfers for the 1966-67 school year would
normally be expected...
(4) If no students transferred from segregated schools under a free choice
plan . . . it will normally be required to adopt a different type of plan. [Omission
of subparagraph (4) was the only relevant amendment made in the guidelines
issued for the 1967-68 school year.]56

Given this language, disclaimers by HEW that it had no intention
of requiring a certain "racial balance" were viewed by its critics as less
than sincere. The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
supported HEW's philosophy. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
54. See 110 CoNG. Ri~c. 13,819-21 (1963).
55. See cases cited notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
56. 31 Fed. Reg. 5623, 5629 (1966); the text for these and other guidelines are conveniently
collected in Hearings. supra note 34, at A6-A39, A93. See also Comment, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964-1mplementation and Impact. 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1968).
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Circuit in 1966 and 1967 carefully and clearly embraced the HEW
guidelines and declared that the rate of desegregation they prescribe
must be taken by federal district courts as the minimum
constitutionally acceptable standards 7 In Green" the Supreme Court
adopted the position of the Office of Education by declaring that those
Southern school districts that had been segregated de jure could employ
freedom of choice plans only if they actually resulted in desegregation.
In doing so it aligned the federal judiciary with HEW and the Federal
Civil Rights Commission, which has consistently taken the position
since 1954 that nonwhites have a constitutional right to associate with
whites.
2. The Model Cities Act of /966.-Congressional disapproval of
former Housing and Urban Development Commissioner Harold
Howe's "integrationist" philosophy was reflected in two restrictive
provisions of the Model Cities Act of 1966. The first reads:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the Secretary to require . . . the adoption
by any community of a program (1) by which pupils now resident in a school
district not within the confines of the area covered by the city demonstration
program shall be transferred to a school or school district including all or part
of such area, or (2) by which pupils now resident in a school district within the
confioes of the area covered by the city demonstration program shall be
transferred to a school or school district not including a part of such area.5

The second deprives the Secretary of authority to require the "adoption
by any community of a program to achieve a racial balance or to
eliminate racial imbalance within school districts."' It is important to
note that this language came to be law through the efforts of certain
nonsouthern legislators. Congressman Abraham Multer of New York
City was the author of the amendments in question.' He, and many
others similarly situated, supported the 1968 prohibition against the use
and withholding of funds to promote racial balance.
3. The Elenientary and Secondar" Education Act of
1965.-Criticism of the cutoffs of federal funds following the
enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 19652
led to attempts to erode the authority of the Commissioner of
57. United States v. Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). pelifton Ior rehearing,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). cert. denied. 389 U.S. 840 (1967): Davis v. School Bd., 372 l.2d
949 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Board of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1967).
58. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3303(d) (Supp. 1969).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3335(f) (Supp. 1969).
61. 112 CONG. REc. 26,948-50 (1966).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 821 (Supp. Ill. 1965-67) [hereinafter cited as ESEA].
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Education from two fronts: first, by curbing his powers to withhold
funds without a hearing, and secondly, by an outright prohibition
against requiring pupil assignments or transportation in order to
overcome racial imbalance.
The second item referred to above occasioned no great ferment,
since it was introduced in 1966 by nonsouthern legislators as a
clarification of the "true" Congressional understanding of HEW's

position on racial imbalance. The prohibition now contained in Section
18 of the ESEA of 1965, as amended, bars HEW from using racial

imbalance as a criterion in reviewing applications for funds from state
educational agencies. 3 It was fashioned by Democratic Representative
James O'Hara of Michigan in an attempt to respond to the charges

made by his colleagues that the Department had grand designs for
racially balanced schools.14 Ironically, it was Commissioner of

Education. Howe who was responsible for the insertion of this and
similar anti-balance limitations in federal legislation. Howe's numerous

speeches expressing his "integrationist" views on education were
quoted generously in the Record in such a way that his apologists, such
as O'Hara, had no alternative but' to respond with limiting
amendments that prevented greater excisions from the powers of the

Commissioner. 5
The other anti-HEW tactic referred to above is somewhat more
complex. It deals with an administrative restriction designed to limit
63. Section 181 of the 1966 ESEA mendments, now in 20 U.S.C. § 884 (Supp. Ill, 196567), "Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any department, agency,
officer or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision or control over the
curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution
or school system, or over the selection of library resources, textbooks, or other printed or
published instructional material by any educational institution or school system, or to require the
assignment or transportation of students or teachers in order to overcome racial imbalance."
64. For the legislative background, see 112 CONG. REC. 25,549-56 (1966).
65. Consider, for example, the amendment unsuccessfully proposed by Representative Fino
as a substitute for O'Hara's amendment: "Nothing in this act shall authorize the reimbursement
of any expenses, howsoever defined . . . in transporting pupils, by bus or otherwise, for the
following purposes:
(I) To achieve racial balance in any school;
(2) To transfer children to a new school district where such new district shall have been
drawn to achieve racial balance in any school;
(3) To attend educational parks or such other facilities as shall have been created or
constructed for any reason including racial balance or socio-economic integration;
(4) To attend any other facility aided in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, by a grant
under Title Ill of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which shall affect
the racial composition of such facility. It is the intent of Congress to prohibit reimbursement
of any expenses involving transportation of children for reasons directly or indirectly
involving racial balance in any educational facility."
112 CONG. REc. 25,553 (1966).
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the ease with which HEW could cut off federal funds from
noncomplying districts. In the days following the promulgation of the
initial set of guidelines, HEW claimed that they had not cut off federal
funds to districts which had not yet complied with the guidelines, but
were simply "deferring action" on the application of these districts."
As long as action was "deferred," the funds were not released and the
pressure to comply was felt with full force. As far as HEW was
concerned there appeared to have been a greater advantage to invoking
"deferral," since an outright denial would have provoked an even more
hostile legislative reaction. The limitation on the power of HEW to
procrastinate on applications, therefore, required federal officials,
within the limitations specified, to show their hand.
The chief proponent of the administrative tactic has been
Representative L.H. Fountain of North Carolina. In 1966 Fountain
introduced an amendment to the ESEA of 1965 which would have
prevented HEW from deferring action on any application for funds by
local agencies "unless and until, as provided by section 602 of Title VI.
there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for
hearing, '6 7 that the local agency had failed to comply with Title VI.
This amendment was adopted by the House in 1966 but was softened
in the conference committee." Fountain's amendment also outlawed
any deferral without an opportunity for a hearing, which hearing,
presumably, was to be held within the context of the administrative law
regimen of section 602 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." The
language adopted offered HEW a choice; but in any event the
restraining effect of the Fountain amendment was considerably diluted.
As the amendment was finally passed HEW shall not
defer action or order action deferred on any application by a local educational
agency for funds authorized to be appropriated [by various federal laws] on the

basis of alleged noncompliance with the provisions of title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 for more than sixty days after notice is given to such local agency of
such deferral unless such local agency is given the opportunity for a hearing as
provided in section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, such hearing
to be held within sixty days of such notice . . .and such deferral shall not
continue for more than thirty days after the close of any such hearing unless there
has been an express finding on the record of such hearing that such local

educational agency has failed to comply with the provisions of title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19647 o

66. See Hearings,supra note 34, at 31-46.
67. 112 CONG. REc. 25,586-87 (1966).
68. See H.R. 1814 and Conf. Rep. (H.R. REP. No. 2309), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
70. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89750, § 182, 80 Stat. 1191.
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The voting pattern which emerged in response to the Fountain
amendment is instructive. The vote was 22 f-f1f6.11 Republicans voted
almost unanimously (103-4) for the amendment while Democrats were
closely divided (118-112). Of the Deep South Representatives, only
Gonzales of Texas and .Pepper of Florida voted against the amendment.
It will be seen below that these two were among the handful of
Southern congressmen supporting a stronger role for the federal
enforcement of racially balanced schools. Delegations of the states of
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, and New Jersey divided precisely
along party lines, with Democrats opposing and Republicans favoring
the amendment. Those nonsouthern Democrats who voted in favor of
the amendment apparently did so on "ideological" grounds, rather
than on grounds revealed by examining constituency variables. This
conclusion is based on the writer's examination of four major variables
for each constituency in question: percent of district population urban,
percent of district population Negro, median family income, 'and
median years of school completed by the district population. The
examination revealed that there were no marked differences between the
constituencies of proponents and opponents of the amendments.
By 1967 the "racial balance" activities of the Office of Education
led at least one nonsouthern "liberal" congresswoman to urge that the
guidelines be applied to all the country as a way of undermining racial
imbalance. Congresswoman Edith Green, Democrat of Oregon, clearly
delighted her Southern colleagues with her amendment to the ESEA
Amendments of 1967. It accom plished two things: (1)it required HEW
and its agencies to cite "the particular section or sections of statutory
law or other legal authority" which served as the basis for any "rules,
regulations, guidelines, or other published interpretations or orders
issued;" and (2) it required that all "rules, regulations, guidelines,
interpretations, or orders shall be uniformly applied and enforced
throughout the fifty States." Although the Green amendment was the
subject of very enlightening debate in the House, it was accepted by
72
voice vote.
B.

CongressionalAction on Racial Balance in 1968

Before the survey of the 1968 racial balance battle in the Congress
is presented, the reader should be admonished that the writer has no
293 94
- (1966).
71. 112 CoNe. Rc. 25,586-87 (1966). See also 17 CoNU. 0. ALMANAC
CoNu. Rac. H5798,
113
see
denate,
the
For
1965-67).
1II,
(Supp.
888
72. 20 U.S.C. §
H5932 (daily ed., May 22, 1967).
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intention of creating an oversimplified impression that the courts and
the executive bureaucracy are aligned against the Congress in the
matter of racial balance. In many instances Congress has given the
courts and the bureaucracy as much support as constituency pressures
would permit. Certain federal legislators, of course, have displayed a
strong involvement with the racial balance movement as a "civil
rights" issue. One may cite in this connection the measures introduced
and advocated by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell7 and by
Senator Edward M. Kennedy. 4 Both of these measures would have
redefined segregation to include racial imbalance. Powell's measure
would have cut off federal funds whenever racial concentrations of
nonwhites in any public school exceeded a 20 percent variation from
the average percentage of nonwhites in the district's total pupil
population. Kennedy's proposal would have provided federal funds to
encourage state and local racial balance programs. Neither of these
measures has elicited strong support, but they serve to illustrate the
kind of policy posture favored"by those legislators who have endorsed
the "integrationist" stance of the bureaucracy.
The 1968 deliberations on racially balanced schools began on June
26, 1968, when the House refused to excise the "Whitten
Amendments" which had been added to the Labor-HEW
Appropriations bill of 1969 by the Committee on Appropriations.75
Authored by Representative Jamie Whitten, Democrat of Mississippi,
the amendments read:
Sec. 409. No part of the funds contained in this Act may be used to force busing
of students, abolishment of any school, or to force any student attending any
secondary [and elementary] school to attend a particular school against the choice
of his or her parents or parent.
Sec. 410. No part of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to force busing

of students, the abolishment of any school, or the attendance of students of a
particular school as a condition precedent to obtaining Federal funds otherwise
available to any State, school district, or school7

The motion to strike out the amendments was voted on first by a
division, resulting in a vote of 75 to 116, and then by a teller vote-with
101 ayes and 137 nays. 7 The debate was clearly defined: "liberal"
nonsouthern congressmen argued that without meaningful sanctions
Southern school desegregation would never be realized; Southern
73.

H.R. 13079, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).

74. S. 2928, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
75.
76.
77.

114 CONG. REC. H5665 (daily ed. June 26, 1968).
See id. at H5644-60.
Id. at H5665.
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congressmen argued that the effect of the amendments was merely to
restrain federal bureaucrats from doing what they were in principle
prohibited from doing but were doing nonetheless.
As passed by the House, sections 409 and 410 of the Labor-HEW
Appropriations Act of 1969 were definitely curbs on the operations of
the Office of Education throughout the country. The Senate version
restated section 409's House-approved language, but added the phrase:
"inorder to overcome racial imbalance. '7 8 In other words, it limited
the operation of the House's amendment to "force" racial balance
situations. As for section 410, the Senate amended the House's
language by inserting "in order to overcome racial imbalance"
immediately before "as a condition precedent . . . ." Quite
significantly, however, the Senate added a requirement calling for
nationally uniform enforcement of HEW guidelines. The Senate
language was considerably more specific than the original Green
amendment discussed above; it required the Secretary to assign as
many personnel to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "in
the other States as are assigned to the seventeen Southern and border
States."7 In addition, the Secretary was required to enforce the law
"by like methods and with equal emphasis in all States of the Union
and to report to the Congress by March 1, 1969, on the actions he has
taken and the results achieved in establishing this compliance program
on a national basis."80 It is the Senate language which is in effect at
this writing.
The next step in the analysis is to-identify those nonsouthern
Representatives who voted against racial balance and those
Southerners who had voted for racial balance and attempt to
understand their behavior in terms of major constituency factors:
percent of district population urban, percent of Negro population,
median family income of families in the district, and the median years
of school completed by district inhabitants. 8 ' There were only four
78. S. Rep. No. 1484, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1968) coniains the following language: "The
Committee has approved sections 409 and 410 with perfecting amendments. The sections are not
intended to place restrictions on local school authorities who wish to bus school children for
reasons other than to overcome racial imbalance."
79. Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations Act, 1969,
Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 410, 82 Stat. 969.

80. Id.
81. For our purposes a nonsouthern representative was counted as opposed to racial balance
if he voted against racial balance on either or both of the votes; a Southern representative was
counted as in favor of racial balance if he voted for racial balance on either or both of the votes.
The votes may be explained as follows: Roll Call 366: on Flood motion that the House recede
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congressmen from the Deep South who voted in favor of the stronger
racial balance powers of HEW. In each of the four cases it appears
that the favorable vote was cast for slightly differing reasons, none of
which are very illuminating as to the future of the racial balance
movement. Congressman Boggs of Louisiana has a very large
proportion of nonwhites in his district's population (29.2 percent). He
was as anxious to preserve his pro-Administration stance in view of the
approaching election in which he faced a serious challenge. The
behavior of Congressmen Eckhardt, Gonzales, and Pepper is
explainable in ethnic terms. All three represented districts with a high
proportion of Spanish-Americans.
The voting pattern of border state congressmen on the racial
balance issue was characteristically ambivalent. Representatives of
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Delaware, voted unanimously with their
Deep South colleagues, while in Oklahoma's delegation only Majority
Leader Carl Albert was a consistent supporter of the administration
position. Maryland, on the other hand, was divided six to one in favor
of racial balance. Missouri and West Virginia were closely divided.
All of the nonsouthern congressional delegations, with the notable
exceptions discussed below, were against the amendments which would
have weakened the power of HEW to prescribe racially balanced
schools. The nonsouthern opponents of stronger HEW powers in this
area were primarily Republican, and in view of the saliency of the
partisanship involved in these votes, one is tempted to say that other
factors were of minimal significance. There are some aspects of the
voting behavior, however, which deserve attention.
A relatively large number of Republicans from districts with a
relatively low percentage of urban population (very often these had low
percentages of nonwhites as well) were opponents of racial balance in
schools. It is suggested that these constituencies and their legislators
found little interest in what seemed to them a strictly urban
controversy. In addition, the Senate-passed version called for an
expansion of the Office of Education bureaucracy, and it is plausible
that these grassroots Republicans found this distasteful.
The voting of the Representatives of the "large and divided
states" of California, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania provide the
most difficult interpretative challenge. Partisan considerations may be
from its disagreement to the Senate amendment 63 and concur therein with an
amendment-which would have restored the original text of Whitten's amendments; Roll Call
368: on Cohelan preferential motion that the House recede from its disagreement to Senate
amendment 64 (dealing with withholding of funds) and concur therein.
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called into service again, but in a number of these states-notably Ohio
and Pennsylvania-there were clear deviations from a party line. In
Ohio six Republicans voted with four Democrats in favor of racial
balance, while the Republicans were alone in opposing racial balance.

In Pennsylvania the voting pattern is not clear: two Republicans and
eight Democrats were classed "for racial balance" while ten

Republicans and three Democrats were "against racial balance."
VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Despite constitutional confusion on the matter for the time being,
a number of significant legislative steps in the direction of racially
balanced public schools have beei taken at the local level. One state,
Massachusetts, has adopted a law requiring local school authorities to
maintain nonwhite pupil concentrations below the 50 percent level in
all public schools or suffer the loss of state subsidies. Several state
educational authorities have acted to foster public school pupil
populations which are racially heterogeneous. Finally, there are
important indications that many policy-makers and legislators at the
federal level support racial balance as an element of the m9dern liberaldemocratic credo.
These manifestations of support for racial balance, however, are
intermingled with contradictory trends. The preceding analysis of
congressional struggles over racial balance underscores the difficulty of
convincing persons of diverse backgrounds and attitudes of the
advisability of racially balanced schools. Despite a certain amount of
acrimony, some local and state units have approved racial balance as
a public policy; but where the policy has been successful, the
community in question has, for one reason or another, chosen it-of its
own accord. Thus far, Congress has devoted its energies toward
prohibiting the executive branch from requiring racial balance. At the
same time, other interests have attempted to establish the policy of
permitting, but not requiring, local authorities to balance schools with
federal blessing.
The examination of present federal statutory authority relative to
racial balance leads to the conclusion that so long as Congress attempts
to apply one standard to the South and another to the nonsouth, it will
be plagued by semantical, syntactical, and theoretical embarrassments.
The statutory language requiring HEW authorities to apply Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on a national, uniform basis is rendered
meaningless by the treatment of "racial imbalance" as a definitional
category distinct from "segregation."
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Finally, the data presented in support of and in opposition to
racial balance give some measure of credence to the argument that a
broad spectrum of the American public is opposed to further advances
in the area of Negro rights. Just as significantly, however, the data
demonstrate that there are many nonsouthern Representatives with a
substantial percentage of Negroes in their constituencies who genuinely
favor racially balanced public schools as a public policy.

